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  Laurent Stern

Abstract
Disgust about material objects and moral behavior are both at
issue in understanding pornography. Previous debates were
fueled primarily by moral disgust. Erotic art may elicit moral
disgust, but only hard-core pornography elicits material
disgust. I discuss the role of attraction and aversion in
labeling artworks pornographic. Since we always have a
choice between acknowledging and ignoring a disgust elicitor,
aversion may be a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for
such a label. In submitting our choice to rational critique, we
must ask: what do we accept as a consequence of the claim
that that x is disgusting? Relying on moral disgust, the
traditionalist's verdict that x is pornographic can be grounded
exclusively in his report that for him x is a disgust elicitor.
The skeptic must submit all disgust elicitors to rational
critique. As a result of such a critique, the skeptic may agree
(or disagree) with the traditionalist that x is pornographic.
Also, the skeptic may decide that x provides pleasure despite
or because of its painful aspect. A weak defense of the
distinction between works of pornography and erotic artworks
is offered with the help of examples; a stronger and more
speculative defense of the distinction relies on the connection
between material disgust elicitors and death.
Keywords
anxious object, erotic art, hard-core pornography, material
disgust, moral disgust, object used as pornography, obscene,
pornographic, 'pornography' (pornography in scare-quotes),
rational critique, seeing-in, shocking

1.Introduction
Recent work on the concept of disgust helps us understand
hard-core pornography. Disgust about material objects and
moral behavior can be easily distinguished: in its primary
sense disgust relates to "animals (including humans), their
parts, waste products, or objects that resemble any of these,
or are disgusting by virtue of their association with any of
them."[1] We speak about moral disgust in a secondary or
metaphorical sense. When talking about disgust, these two
senses were not always distinguished. While both will help us
to understand pornography, previous debates were fueled
primarily by moral disgust. By reflecting on hard-core
pornography that provokes moral disgust alone, we will
provide a way to understand pornography in the context of
material disgust. The burden of this paper is to offer a clear
demarcation between erotic art and hard-core pornography.
Only the latter elicits material disgust.
"Pornography" and "pornographic" are relatively new terms
that were introduced in the second half of the nineteenth
century to replace "obscenity" and "obscene." Reference to
aversion, repulsion or disgust assimilates "pornography" and

"pornographic" to the older terms. Contrary to holders of
fundamentalist or sectarian religious views, we must not rely
on references to nudity or explicit sexual content, since both
are displayed in some great artworks, and we would reject the
claim that they are pornographic. Many artworks have been
used as pornography,[2] and some have been called
pornographic. While skepticism is warranted about claims that
an object is both art and pornography, it would be dogmatic
and unwise to suggest here that art cannot be pornography or
vice versa.[3]
2. Controversial verdicts
Justice Potter Stewart seemed to accept failure about defining
"hard-core pornography" when writing in Jacobellis v. Ohio,
378 U.S. 184, (1964):
I shall not today attempt further to define the
kinds of material I understand to be embraced
within that shorthand description; and perhaps I
could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I
know it when I see it, and the motion picture
involved in this case is not that.
Contrary to his claims, Stewart's words can lead us if not to a
definition of pornography, then to a way of understanding
what it means to deem a work purporting to be art or
literature pornographic.
On what grounds could Stewart say that he knows
pornography when he sees it? We all can know it when seeing
pornography. This does not imply that we do know it or that
we are not mistaken. In fact, Stewart's words were written in
support of overturning the Ohio Supreme Court's verdict. So,
how did he know that Louis Malle's movie Les Amants (1958)
was not pornographic, and hence entitled to protection against
censorship? How do we know that it is not pornographic?
We must monitor our reactions while watching the film, and
afterwards submit the movie to reappraisal or rational
critique. These conditions are not self-evident. Ordinarily
when seeing a work of visual art or reading a literary work, we
must reflect on what we have seen or read before pronouncing
critical judgment. Yet, even when we are acting as critics,
reflection on how we experience that work is not required.
However, only such reflection will support our claim about the
pornographic nature of that work.
When we pronounce the verdict that a given work is (or is not)
pornographic, we provide information about ourselves. Still,
two judges or two critics may come to accept contrary
verdicts. And when engaged in the debate about two
contraries, we will reject one verdict. Moreover, we will
criticize the judge or critic whose verdict we reject, because he
let himself be misguided by reflection on his own experience
while examining that work. He succeeded in telling us only
about himself rather than about the nature of the work; and
there is hardly anything more damning about a judge or critic
whose judgment we reject.
3. Attraction and repulsion
Pornography is driven by curiosity, which is fueled by our

desire to learn about the lives of others regardless of whether
we encounter them in our own world or in the imaginary world
of realist art or literature. Without such curiosity we could not
be drawn to a work that could be pornographic. In
experiencing that work and in reflecting on our own experience
we become aware of our delight, disgust, or both delight and
disgust. The mixed reactions of attraction and aversion are
somewhere between pure delight and pure disgust. Excluding
cases of our rejection of works purporting to be art from lack
of interest or dissatisfaction with the ways they satisfy our
curiosity, we are accustomed to responding in the context of
art or literature not only to what it is about, but also to how
its subject matter is presented. Since each of us must decide
whether a work is or is not pornographic, it is possible that
some will decide that no work is both art and pornography,
while others will hold that some works can be both.
We are on the right path in identifying pornography when in
reflecting on our experience of an artwork we find that we
were drawn into its fictional world. We were no longer
spectators looking at that world, but in our imagination were
drawn into participating in its activities. Spectators or even
the most reprehensible voyeurs are always outside of what
they observe. Within that world we are confronting
pornography only if we experience both attraction and
aversion.
These markers are not unique to experiencing pornography;
they are shared with other forms of art. For example:
according to Noël Carroll, the enjoyment of horror is also
driven by curiosity and the experience of both delight and
disgust; and Carolyn Korsmeyer[4] has drawn attention to
"the mystery of why seemingly normal human beings seek out
experiences that deliver unpleasantness, even pain," and to
the solutions of this "paradox of aversion." Even if all markers
for pornography are common to at least one other art form,
they are useful to understand what pornography is. Neither
singly nor jointly do they provide a definition of pornography.
Contradicting your judgment, I may claim that a given artwork
is not pornographic. At issue is what either of us calls
attractive or repulsive, or both. According to Malle's account,
the Archbishop of Venice denounced Les Amants as obscene
without seeing it. His failure to see it seems to disqualify his
judgment. But we must not prematurely reject this judgment,
for its grounds will turn out to be important. Besides, had he
seen this movie he would have reached the same verdict.
However, we must assume that the Supreme Court judges of
the State of Ohio had seen this movie before rendering their
verdict. They too denounced it as obscene. What did they
find objectionable?
They objected to the story told in this movie from a moral
point of view: a mother leaves her husband and the young
daughter she loves for a man she met only a few hours earlier
and with whom she fell in love. This film is not erotic; it is
about the powers of love at first sight. If you happen to agree
with the moral judgment of the Archbishop or the majority of
the Ohio Supreme Court judges, then you will reject the movie
on moral grounds. You may counsel others to avoid it or you
may call it 'pornographic.'[5]

Your moral judgment may induce you to develop aversion,
displeasure, even disgust when confronted with this movie.
We must ask, are feelings of aversion, uniquely rooted in
moral judgments, sufficient for labeling visual artworks
pornography? In trying to answer this question neither an
affirmative nor a negative answer provides guidance for
deciding whether a work is pornographic.
You may prefer an affirmative answer. Suppose a judge or a
critic addressing the topic of censorship argues: I am
disgusted by x, hence x must be condemned as pornography
on moral grounds. His opponent could respond: I am
delighted by y; hence y must be celebrated on moral grounds.
Both arguments must be rejected, for we may be prompted to
reject these conclusions while accepting their premises. What
is this movie about? The Archbishop's verdict can be
disqualified on two grounds. Without seeing it, he could not
know how this movie presents what it is about. And even if he
had seen it and had agreed with the subsequent judgment of
the Ohio Supreme Court, his verdict would be disqualified. For
the Archbishop and the majority of the Ohio Supreme Court
judges failed to realize that the way in which this movie
presents its subject radically changes that subject. We may
acknowledge the Archbishop's or the Ohio Supreme Court's
moral concerns, or we may reject them. Either way, moral
concerns will not transform a movie about love into an erotic
movie, or into an obscene or pornographic one.
Still, if you believe that feelings of aversion uniquely grounded
in moral judgments are sufficient for claiming that a work is
pornographic, you will dig in your heels, and dismiss my
contrary arguments. My answer to you is negative. I have
admitted that aversion is necessary for designating a given
work pornographic. As a conciliatory gesture to the most
dogmatic views—exemplified by the judgment of religious
extremists—I am even willing to add that the aversion can be
uniquely grounded in moral judgments. However, unless we
are dealing with pornographic works, my necessary condition
cannot be transformed into a sufficient condition. I may be
tolerant of your idiosyncratic judgment about what you
consider disgusting and at the same time dismiss your
judgment that the work you examined is pornographic. You
may have developed disgust when you were confronted with
Les Amants or Lady Chatterley's Lover, but this does not mean
that they are pornographic. Anyone who does not share your
idiosyncratic tastes will resist that judgment.
4. Can there be experts on pornography?
It could be argued that if pornography invites viewers or
readers to focus on its subject matter and excludes concern
with its aesthetic characteristics, then we have a clear
demarcation between pornography and great art, and maybe
even between pornography and insignificant art. Arguments
derived from the defining characteristics of art or pornography
should be resisted: they do not teach us anything new either
about art or about pornography. Nor do they illuminate the
wide variety of experiences reported about erotic art or
literature.
In a discussion between two skeptical critics who hold similar
views in matters of morals, politics, and aesthetics, one

reports that Lady Chatterley's Lover is a pornographic work,
while the other disagrees with this claim. So, how do we
bridge the gap between information about a critic to the object
of his critique? If we agree that the work is not pornographic,
then our own judgment merely reinforces the verdict of
others. Our examination of the work ends, and we can only
add that those who contradict our judgment testify against
themselves, because they have substituted what was in their
own minds about an object for the nature of that object. Only
if we agree that the work is pornographic must we bridge the
gap between the critic and the object of his critique. The
burden of proof is on the critic who judges a work
pornographic.
In agreeing with that critic and in accepting the burden of
proof, we must avoid inadequate strategies. We cannot argue
that a work is pornographic because it was solely created to
satisfy salacious interests. For artworks that were created to
satisfy such interests could turn out to be not at all
pornographic. And there are many works we may wish to label
pornographic even without knowing their creators' intentions.
Also, issues of censorship and pornography must be kept
apart, for there may be good reasons for prohibiting the
admission of juvenile spectators to the exhibition of certain
artworks, even if we do not consider them pornographic.
Finally, and most importantly, critics and aestheticians cannot
refer judgment to others―such as reasonable persons of
average sensibility―when deciding whether a work is
pornographic. This strategy is open only to judges who must
rule on issues of censorship. Critics of artworks must rely on
their own judgment, and in pronouncing their verdict must
invite their audience to agree with that verdict. They abdicate
their position as critics, if they rely on the judgment of others
when deciding whether an artwork is pornographic.
When we disagree with a critic who calls a work pornographic,
we withdraw our confidence in his judgment in all matters
relating to pornography. For we reject his idiosyncratic
judgment while reporting aversion or disgust when he was
confronted with the object he examined. At issue is not the
veracity of his report, but only that he failed to submit this
report to what I shall call "rational critique."
5. Rational critique
In such a critique we become aware that we always have the
choice of setting aside a given disgust elicitor. I may ignore or
reject from consideration the disgusting features of an object
that you acknowledge. Even if that object is a disgust elicitor
for both of us, we always have a choice about the conclusions
we draw from a disgust response. My response may be
embedded in a more complex reaction than yours (or the
other way around). One of us may appreciate that object
either despite or because of its disgusting features. Among
earlier writers on disgust, the failure to submit reports of
disgust to critique was common; its traces can be found even
in writings that became central to the contemporary debates
on disgust. Two examples deserve to be mentioned: Aurel
Kolnai's philosophical monograph on disgust, Der Ekel[6]
(1929), and the paper by the psychologist and psychoanalyst
Andras Angyal, "Disgust and Related Aversions."[7] Both

mention questionable disgust elicitors[8] that fail the test of
rational critique.[9] From their failure we can infer that wholly
idiosyncratic disgust elicitors must be ignored.
Subsequently, writers on disgust primarily chose examples
showing the cross-cultural relevance of disgust elicitors. Work
in this tradition is important because we may find that more
than one disgust elicitor is innate. While I would welcome
such a finding, I now urge that we consider the cultural
background of the disgust elicitors, as Martha Nussbaum has
argued. She was the first writer on disgust who insisted on
submitting (sincere) reports of being disgusted to rational
critique.[10] When you say that you are disgusted by x, we
ask, what you accept as a consequence of this claim. We
learn from our elders, caregivers and members of our group
what to label disgusting. The consequence of accepting their
teaching is often (but not always) beneficial.
There are no good reasons for doubting your sincere reports of
being disgusted by x. Accepting and internalizing idiosyncratic
disgust elicitors is harmful only when this leads to socially
pernicious conclusions. Still, your reaction to x is subject to
debate only if it reveals to others something about the nature
of x. Only if your judgment is irrelevant can we claim that it
doesn't reveal anything about the object of our disagreement.
Upon learning about the plot of Les Amants or seeing that
movie, the Archbishop of Venice, and the Ohio Supreme Court
judges did find what they considered a disgust elicitor:
Jeanne, the character played by Jeanne Moreau, abandons not
only her husband for the man she met a few hours earlier, but
also the daughter she loves. Her transgression is
unpardonable. Instead of receiving their just punishment, the
lovers depart to enjoy their newly found bliss.
According to the dogmatic defender of traditional moral or
religious values, this movie advocates disgusting behavior that
satisfies the sufficient condition for being called
pornographic.[11] Even skeptics in moral and religious
matters find the mother's behavior shocking, and admit that
the necessary conditions are met for calling it 'pornographic'.
Doubt about this topic can be easily overcome by asking
whether or not Jeanne will be proud of having abandoned her
daughter. The short answer is no. But there is common
ground between the traditionalist and the skeptic. Without
that there cannot be a debate. The skeptic's shock is
grounded on aversion to Jeanne's behavior. While the
skeptic's admission that it is shocking, permits and facilitates
further interpretation, the traditionalist's verdict that it is
pornographic ends all effort at interpretation. The skeptic has
good reasons to believe that he has a deeper understanding of
the moral issues presented in this movie than the
traditionalist.
The traditionalist's verdict that a given work x is pornographic
can be grounded exclusively in his sincere report that for him
it is a disgust elicitor. From his viewpoint the sufficient
conditions for calling it pornographic have been met, even if
he relies exclusively on moral disgust. The skeptic needs more
to reach his verdict. As long as he relies only on moral
disgust, his views can be differentiated from those of the
traditionalist only if he submits them to rational critique. For

regardless of whether he relies on moral or material disgust,
rational critique provides a fundamental choice to ignore or
acknowledge the disgust elicitor. Only disgust based on what
the skeptic considers idiosyncratic taste deserves to be
ignored. For the verdict based on such taste does not hit the
target of its critique. If the work does not meet the skeptic's
necessary condition of being pornographic, if it is not even
shocking, he will dismiss his opponent's verdict, since it does
not reveal anything about the work. Given the traditionalist's
irrelevant judgment, he ceases to be a valid conversation
partner for the skeptic.
By acknowledging the disgust elicitor, the skeptic is provided
with three choices. First, he may decide that any redeeming
feature or aesthetic value ascribed to x is vitiated by the
disgust elicitor. In this case the skeptic will agree with the
traditionalist's verdict that the work is pornographic. Second,
if the aesthetic value ascribed to the work overrides the
aversion caused by the disgust elicitor, the skeptic may decide
that disgust is a price worth paying for the pleasure provided
by the work, that it provides pleasure despite its painful
aspect. Third, he may decide that it provides pleasure
because of its painful aspect. This alternative exemplifies
what Matthew Strohl describes as strong ambivalence: "a
complex experience has the pleasure structure partly in virtue
of one or more of its elements (complex or atomic) having the
pain structure."[12]
In acknowledging that the work contains a disgust elicitor
while rejecting the claim that it is pornographic, the skeptic
suggests that it satisfies only the necessary condition of
pornography. The traditionalist's pornography is the skeptic's
shocking work of art or literature. The following example
illuminates three different uses of the word "pornography":
Senator Jesse Helms called some of Robert Mapplethorpe's
works pornography in the ordinary sense of the word. When
the photographer introduced himself by saying, "I am Robert
Mapplethorpe the pornographic photographer," irony was
evident. When Arthur Danto used scare quotes in referring to
Mapplethorpe's 'pornographic' work, he wanted to draw
attention to its shocking quality.
When professional critics or art historians speak about the
erotic content of an "anxious object" or its "shocking quality,"
they inform their audience of connoisseurs that the interest of
these works is not exhausted by what the untutored amateur
can see.[13] For the untutored, Cézanne's apples were just
decorative elements; when asked what they saw, they would
have answered: apples. For connoisseurs it was easy to see
that these apples had a disturbing quality in Cézanne's
paintings. Yet, even they needed a specialist's help for seeingin[14] these anxious objects female breasts.[15] Without
such help they could not articulate what was disturbing in
these paintings. Examples of anxious objects can be found
even in the context of non-figurative art. Visitors to the
Willem de Kooning Retrospective Exhibition at the Museum of
Modern Art (2011/12) read the curator's note attached to the
late paintings: "the works evoke constantly changing, swelling
and contracting spaces." Where untutored amateurs see only
decorative elements in these paintings, connoisseurs see their
disturbing quality, but they too must be prompted by

professional critics to see-in these paintings male sexual
organs.[16]
Robert Mapplethorpe, Larry Clark and David Hamilton are not
pornographic photographers. A fundamental element in some
of their works is the sexually explicit shocking quality. Had
they failed to create such anxious objects, they would have
been unable to say what they wanted to say. The difference
between sexually explicit anxious objects and pornography is
unavailable to the untutored amateur. While in Cézanne's
apples and de Kooning's drawings he only sees decorative
objects, in the photographers' sexually explicit works he only
sees pornography.
Fortunately, the untutored amateur is unable to see the
shocking quality in Cézanne's and de Kooning's anxious
objects. For he would react to their work as he responds to
the work of Mapplethorpe or Malle's Les Amants. Misled into
believing that the sufficient condition for calling them
pornography has been met, he may even call for censoring
these works. Professional critics and connoisseurs can only
admit that these works meet the necessary condition of
pornography ― at most they are pornography in scare quotes.
By focusing on cases where critics or historians of art drew
attention to the shocking quality of certain artworks we have
gained a preliminary foothold for understanding pornography
without scare quotes. We will find the sufficient conditions
that must be satisfied for a work to be called pornography in
the context of issues raised by material disgust.
6. Disgust
Catherine McKinnon and Andrea Dworkin suggested as
markers of pornography:
…the graphic sexually explicit subordination of
women through pictures and/or words that also
includes one or more the following: (i) women
are presented dehumanized as sexual objects,
things or commodities; (ii) women are presented
as sexual objects who enjoy humiliation or pain;
(iii) women are presented as sexual objects
experiencing sexual pleasure in rape, incest or
other sexual assault; (iv) women are presented
as sexual objects tied up, cut up or mutilated or
bruised or physically hurt; (v) women are
presented in postures or positions of sexual
submission, servility or display; (vi) women’s
body parts — including but not limited to vaginas,
breasts or buttocks — are exhibited by being
reduced to those parts; or (vii) women are being
penetrated by objects or animals; or (viii) women
are presented in scenarios of degradation,
humiliation, injury, torture, shown as filthy or
inferior, bleeding, bruised, or hurt in a context
that makes these conditions sexual.[17]
These markers could be suitably extended to cover men,
children, and transsexuals. Moral or material disgust would be
my initial reaction when presented with a work exhibiting any
of these markers. In favorable cases such an initial reaction
would be superseded by a more complex reaction. If so, I will

revise my judgment, and argue that I am confronting a work
that is shocking, but not pornographic. Three more points:
First, most reports about being disgusted are subjective. If
your list of disgust elicitors is incompatible with mine, then we
will call each other's judgment idiosyncratic. Disgust is such a
strong response that minimally competent critics or judges are
not mistaken when they claim they are disgusted. Erotic art
or literature is not a disgust elicitor in my judgment:
McKinnon and Dworkin agree on this point.[18] Suppose that
in your judgment such art or literature is a disgust elicitor.
Your reaction must be submitted to rational critique, just as
the reactions of those who are disgusted when encountering
homosexuals, Jews, or Blacks must be submitted to rational
critique. Homophobia or racism does not provide exemption
from the obligation to respect the rights of others. Moral or
material disgust must be set aside when judging by standards
of justice. Similarly, when we attribute aesthetic value to a
work of art or literature that we examine, moral disgust must
be set aside, while material disgust plays an important role.
Second, the display of erotic art may be inappropriate in
certain circumstances. For example, it would be inappropriate
for a dealer located next to a High School to display
reproductions of great erotic art from the European, Indian or
Japanese tradition in his windows. In designating a given work
pornographic, we draw attention to its objective features
rather than to the appropriateness of its display.
Third, at this stage caution is required. As soon as I admit
that your report of being disgusted by x is part of the evidence
about its nature, I must ask whether the lists of our material
disgust elicitors are commensurable. If upon investigation it
turns out that your list is incompatible with mine, I cannot
accept your counsel that the work is pornographic:
henceforth, your views about pornography become unusable
to me.
7. Disgust and death
Hard-core pornography without scare quotes is omnipresent on
the Internet. The display of naked bodies or body parts
engaged in sexual activities at first may only have a titillating
effect, without eliciting either moral or material disgust. Since
responses to disgust elicitors are subjective, some viewers will
not be disgusted by every picture, video or film displayed on
the Internet labeled "pornography." Others will not respond
with aversion to any such display. For most others, moral
disgust arises during or after viewing. Typically, they worry
about doing what they ought not to be doing. From there, a
short step may lead to material disgust. Fascinated by the
display of body parts that are among the least expressive of a
person's inner life or character, they become aware of
witnessing a mindless or mechanical activity. The expression
of emotions, care, tenderness, or love for the partner in the
displayed activity is contrary to the pornographers' concern.
Grunts, groans and one-syllable words are occasionally heard
as a reminder that this is not the encounter of brute animals.
One extreme reaction to the excitement generated leads to
fantasizing about participating in the action in order to achieve
solitary or shared pleasure. At the other extreme, disgust cuts
short the excitement.

Average viewers and readers of pornography are found
somewhere between the two extremes: fantasizing
participation and, short of rejection, experiencing extreme
disgust. Before concluding that they actually are confronting
pornography, we must submit their judgment to rational
critique. For they may be perceiving a merely shocking
artwork as pornography; they may be confronting what only
satisfies pornography's necessary, but not its sufficient,
condition.
At this stage the reader may expect that I will provide an
example of pornography. I will not do so because any
example by another person can be dismissed as merely
revealing that person's idiosyncratic disgust elicitors. Nagisa
Oshima's In the Realm of the Senses (1976)[19] is a better
guide to understand pornography than the videos available on
the Internet, because in addition to its social and political aims
this movie is an extended meditation on pornography. Once
we submit it to rational critique, the segments that seemed
pornographic turn out to be merely shocking.
This movie is about dated historical events. The narrative
leads the viewer through the different stages of pornography,
from moral to material disgust, and from there to death. It
starts with a woman named Sada Abe who is working as a
maid at the inn of Kichizo Ishida. They become lovers. The
viewer's first reaction is moral disgust, elicited by Sada's
subaltern role in this unequal relationship. Later on the roles
are reversed and she takes the lead in their lovemaking.
Unless the viewer is impervious to all material disgust elicitors,
at least one scene will motivate disgust. For some it will be
where Sada engages in oral sex with Kichizo, ending with Sada
vomiting seminal fluid. For others, it will be where upon
Sada's urging Kichizo commits rape upon a corpulent servant
girl and an old geisha. The strongest material disgust is
elicited by the last scene. With Kichizo's consent, Sada applies
pressure to Kichizo's carotid artery in order to revive his
flagging sexuality, thereby accidentally strangling him. Fleeing
the police, she cuts off and takes with her the virile member
that had connected them.
Concentrating on the sequences that elicit moral and material
disgust in this movie, it may be possible to create short videos
separated from the narrative that could be considered
pornographic. Yet within their original context these
sequences are not pornographic. The aim of a pornographic
video or film is to show sexual detail. The close-ups and lowlevel shots focus on body parts in the process of genital, oral,
or anal sexual activity. Pornography stars perform for the
camera and the fascinated viewer. What is the object of this
fascination?
On offer for the completely inexperienced is satisfaction of
curiosity; for the more experienced it is a reminder of what
has been called the primal scene. For our purposes it is
irrelevant whether the experienced viewer witnessed or only
heard about that scene in his early childhood. Shock, aversion
and disgust are natural responses of the young child who
cannot deal with adult sexual activities. The adult viewer of
pornography understands what in his early years was
unintelligible. Yet the effect of the displayed biological, animal

activity accompanied by grunts and groans is similar to what
the young child may have experienced or heard about.
Temporarily or permanently shut out from more satisfactory
forms of sexual activity, the adult viewer is both attracted to
and repelled by the display of copulating humans. He is
attracted by the pornographer's focus on the animal nature of
human beings, by what is common to both man and beast.
What differentiates man from beast is excluded. Traditionally
it was called soul, today we are used to speaking about the
self. In the absence of a self, a biological being or its part is
merely flesh that is subject to decay and death. Bereft of a
soul, "man is a worm and food for worms."[20] What attracts
the viewer is exactly the same as what he finds disgusting.
Were it not for the constant movement of the actors in
pornographic videos, the viewer would identify the object of
his fascination and disgust: death. In Susan Sontag's words:
"What pornography is really about, ultimately, isn't sex but
death."[21]
The connection between disgust and death has been noted in
recent philosophical literature.[22] Without that connection,
material disgust could not be a secure guide to pornography.
Why? Because we become aware of idiosyncratic disgust
elicitors only in the process of rational critique. Accordingly,
reports of disgust that have not been submitted to rational
critique cannot serve as guides to pornography. And since
disgust does not do any work independently of its rational
critique, we could rely exclusively on the latter to designate an
object as pornographic. Yet even if we could do so, it would
be unwise to follow this strategy. For as long as material
disgust is not overcome and absorbed by a more complex
reaction, we gain a distinguishing mark of pornography. By
relying on material disgust, we come to understand
"pornography" as a classificatory term, and thereby establish a
demarcation line that separates pornography from erotic art or
literature.
In realist art, erotic artworks can be anything but
pornography, yet they have been used as pornography. That
is why they are condemned by viewers who hold extremist
religious or moral views: finding reasons there for censuring
such artworks. Except to remind us that anything can be used
as pornography, their judgment must be set aside. A debate
on pornography requires all participants to agree that the
object examined satisfies at least the necessary condition of
pornography, that it is at least shocking. As we noted in the
context of Les Amants, even a moral disgust elicitor can
provide the required shock for debate. Yet, if material disgust
elicitors cannot be discovered within a sexually explicit
artwork, we must conclude that we are confronting erotic art,
which is within the domain of Eros. Pornography is in the
realm of Thanatos.
Just as I did not provide examples of pornographic works, I
will not suggest examples of erotic art. Examples offered from
either of the two domains may turn out to be guided by the
presence—or absence—of idiosyncratic material disgust
elicitors that could not be overcome by rational critique.
Examples of erotic art can be found in books, movies, or
videos containing sexually explicit works that do not aim to be
pornography. We can expect a strong correlation between

works labeled "erotic art" and the reader’s critical judgment
that it is non-pornographic within the terms of the
distinguishing marks introduced here. The idiosyncrasy of
material disgust elicitors excludes a perfect correlation.
It will be objected that by separating pornographic works from
erotic artworks I am merely legislating the use of words.
However, the suggested vocabulary does have explanatory
value. The following three examples provide only a weak
defense of the understanding of pornography I have offered.
They prepare the way for a stronger and more controversial
defense, and they call attention to the continuity between the
older word "obscene" and the relatively recent "pornographic."
First, we can only speculate why Michelangelo's tempera
painting Leda and the Swan was destroyed in the early
seventeenth century on the orders of an expert[23] who
declared it obscene. From a distance of four centuries,
judgment on the many existing copies of this painting will
range over a wide field.[24] Some will claim that it is an
allegorical painting that is not even shocking. Others will claim
that it satisfies the necessary condition of pornography, that it
is pornography, that it is erotic art, that it is not erotic art.
We can only speculate whether moral or material disgust
elicitors motivated the original painting's destruction. Both
interpretations require considerable expertise for seeing
explicit sexual content in this allegorical painting. Viewers
must imagine the swan as Jupiter, and Jupiter as a man before
they can imagine that this painting displayed a man and a
woman in the act of lovemaking. On an alternative
interpretation, viewers must imagine seeing a beast and a
human making love. With either interpretation, distinguishing
moral from material disgust elicitors and the need for rational
critique will prove to be useful.
Second, judgments of what is (or is not) pornography are
subject to change. At the Bibliothèque Nationale de France in
2007 a selection of the library's vast holdings of
erotic/pornographic interest—the enfer—was shown.
Surprisingly, by today's standards only a few of these works
could be judged pornographic. Unexamined moral disgust
prompted antecedent library administrators to relegate most
of these works to the enfer section. Continued secretiveness
about such holdings or about the erotic drawings of major
painters—such as the drawings that are closed to the public in
the Musée Ingres of Montauban—creates mysteries of artworks
that deserve to be shown and in many cases celebrated. In
debates about these matters both sides will find our
distinctions useful.
Third, material disgust that is (or is not) overcome and
absorbed by a more complex reaction guides us in sorting a
given sexually explicit work into one of the two domains.
Therefore it is conceivable that the same disgust elicitor
provokes in one critic material and in the other only moral
disgust. Is the famous "butter scene" in Bernardo Bertolucci's
Last Tango in Paris (1972) simulated or real sex, or is the
spectator witnessing rape? Except for moral or religious
conservatives, critics celebrating this movie forty years ago,
judged it an erotic movie. Since then, its spectators allegedly
witnessed both anal sex and rape. Given such claims, would

the critics who once celebrated it still judge it an erotic movie?
If these claims turn out to be true, would material disgust at
having been unwitting witnesses of such acts convince them
that they were watching pornography? Would rational critique
convince them that even if they knew what they were
witnessing, their material disgust could be overcome and
absorbed by a more complex reaction? For our purposes it is
irrelevant how we answer these questions. We must note only
that what we know about the way in which a sexually explicit
work was produced has a decisive influence on whether we
designate it as erotic art or pornography.
A stronger defense of separating pornographic works from
erotic art relies on the connection between material disgust
elicitors and death. Certainly such a defense will be judged
controversial by the more radically skeptical viewers, or by
readers of pornographic works who deny that death is a
material disgust elicitor. From their viewpoint such a judgment
can be derived only from an idiosyncratic choice of material
disgust elicitors. Analogously to my objection against the
traditionalist in matters of morals, the more radically skeptical
critics could argue that I have been misled by an idiosyncratic
disgust elicitor. Admittedly, the object x that I claim to be
pornographic can be used as pornography, but this does not
say anything about that object. In insisting that it is
pornographic, I am merely legislating the use of
"pornography." Responding in a conciliatory mood, I would
admit that there is a normative element in my designating a
given object pornographic. By this designation I imply that it
failed the test of rational critique. Had it passed that test, I
would have suggested that it did not satisfy the sufficient
condition of pornography, i.e., it is merely shocking and not
pornographic.
We need not argue that in works of pornography the viewer
sees death, but only that he sees-in death. In works that
display explicit sexuality and that we judge to be
pornographic, death is the source of what both attracts and
repulses the viewer. Compared to writings about the fear of
death and the heroism recommended for overcoming that
fear, the literature on disgust about death is quite limited. Yet
it does have a venerable ancestry that can be traced to
Plato.[25] The point of transition from life to death is at the
center of such disgust: we no longer confront a person; we
face only its decaying remains. This sight is both attractive
and repulsive. In works we judge pornographic, we face la
petite mort, the small death (faked, or real) of pornographyactors after the satisfaction of all desires and before they
return to their ordinary lives. Photographic images of actors in
the moment of their small death are strikingly similar to what
can be seen in the moment of transition from life to
death.[26]
A new dimension of curiosity and fascination reveals itself from
the viewpoint of material disgust. Innocent curiosity about the
lives of adults provoked moral disgust. When curiosity is no
longer innocent, moral disgust becomes pointless. Yet, the
curiosity driving pornography remains after the loss of
innocence. What is the object of the remaining curiosity?
What is the focus of the leftover fascination? The habitual
consumer of pornographic videos may choose to speed up or

slow down the action on the screen, until all desires are
satisfied. What is it like to be in that momentary death-like
state? If the video's viewers are curious about a first-person
answer to this question, they could just as well ask, "What is it
like for me to be dead?" Such questions reveal a
contradiction: they suppose that there is a self that can
experience being dead. For lack of empirical studies, we can
only conjecture that the remaining curiosity and the residual
fascination converge. The curiosity driving pornography is
based on an unanswerable question about the momentary
death-like state. The same state, in which all desires are
satisfied, is the residual focus of pornography's habitual
viewers.
Certainly there are viewers for whom images of la petite mort
or the transition to death are not disgust elicitors. As a result
of training in a given profession, some have learned to be
insensitive, while a very small minority may be naturally
insensitive to these disgust elicitors. Can the latter
differentiate works of pornography from erotic artworks? A
negative answer would provide support for establishing death
as the focus of what attracts and repulses the viewer of
pornographic works; moreover, it would provide confirmation
of our differentiation of pornographic works from erotic
artworks.
8. Envoy
Material disgust that is not overcome by a more complex
reaction provided the key for understanding pornography.
Judgments based on material or moral disgust that have not
been subject to rational critique cannot provide guidance about
pornography, for such judgments could not even differentiate
between disgusts that deserve to be ignored from others that
must be acknowledged. Finally, among acknowledged
disgusts, we could differentiate works that are assigned
aesthetic value despite the fact that they contain disgust
elicitors from works that are assigned aesthetic value because
they contain disgust elicitors. Both belong to erotic art and
both often are targets of judgments based on moral disgust
that has not been submitted to rational critique.
An understanding of pornography gained from the perspective
of the literature on disgust could be developed in contrary
directions. Further work could provide a real definition of
pornography, specifying the necessary and sufficient
conditions that an object must satisfy to be designated
pornographic.[27] Alternatively, work in the opposite direction
could result in proof that such a non-relational definition is not
attainable. Between these two extremes, the field is open for
proving the cross-cultural relevance of disgust with death;
alternatively, for showing that our marker of pornography
cannot be detached from individual disgust elicitors considered
idiosyncratic. Regardless of the direction of further work, we
must emphasize that understanding pornography and its
relation to erotic art and literature must not be relegated to
marginal concerns within aesthetics. While there are no
experts on pornography, there are no reasons for believing
that judges, politicians, or self-appointed experts on
community standards will find better markers for
differentiating pornography from erotic artworks than

professionals in art and literary criticism or aesthetics.
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